1
any technologies currently in use struggled with similar competing products before gaining the dominant design. The famous case of the VHS videotape is the best known example of such a battle. The emergence of a dominant design is very hard to predict and cannot be entirely explained by the economic literature. 'The dominant design is not automatically the technologically superior one, nor will it meet the needs of a particular class to the same extent as a customized design would' (e.g. Anderson & Tushman, 1990 and Utterback, 1995) . 'The emergence process for dominant designs has typically been viewed as a black box process involving a sophisticated interaction of technological and non-technological factors' (Lee et al., 1995) . There is even a possibility that no dominant design will emerge, even many years after product introduction. Examples of cases with no dominant design include:
Smartphones, PDA phones, blackberry, regular and advanced cell phones (including clock, photo camera, agenda); HDTV, regular LCD and the plasma screens; Microsoft Xbox, Nintendo Wii, Playstation 3; DVD-R, DVD-RW, DVD-RAM, DVD-D, DVD+R, DVD+RW, DVD+R DL, HD-DVD and Blu-ray. In this paper, we identify conditions under which two or more similar but competing designs will co-exist rather than converge into a single dominant design. First we present known success factors in favor of a single dominant design. We then present known success factors in favor of multiple designs; noting that these may be identical to factors that negatively influence the emergence of a dominant design. Next we investigate the applicability of these factors in a case study. We have chosen the case of the flash memory card industry because in this industry, several designs have co-existed for more than a decade already.
Dominant design definition
The definition of a dominant design has evolved from being a broad and possibly tautological to one that is more specific (Srinivasan, Lilien & Rangaswamy, 2006, p2) . Utterback & Abernathy (1975) were the first authors to use the term dominant design. They defined it as 'a single architecture that establishes dominance in a product category.' A similar definition is used by Anderson and Tushman (1990) and Tegarden, Hatfield, and Echols (1999) . They also use the term 'single architecture' that becomes widely accepted as the industry standard. Widely accepted is a rather vague description. In this study a more specific term for 'widely accepted' will be used, given by Anderson and Tushman (1990) : A design will be considered as the dominant one, when more than 50% of new installations in a product category use the technology. By adding "in a product category", the definition leaves the possibility that different dominant designs can emerge in different product categories or niches at the same time. Furthermore, no distinction will be made between locally or globally emerged dominant designs.
Factors in favor of a dominant design.
Installed Base, Complementary Goods, Lock-in effect Over the last decade several studies have found empirical support for installed base effects on technology adoption (e.g. Schilling, 1999; Suárez, 2004; Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . The phrase installed base refers to the group of users for a specific design. The size of the installed base may serve as a signal to consumers about the quality or value of the product, especially when it is hard for the consumers to measure the quality or value (Schilling, 1999) . Furthermore, a technology with a large installed base will often attract developers of complementary goods. Complementary goods are products (but also capabilities or assets) that should be combined with the innovation in question. A wide variety of complementary goods will attract extra users, increasing the installed base. The result is a self-reinforcing mechanism of installed base and complementary goods availability, which may give an early technology an advantage in the fight for dominance (Schilling, 1999) . Once users have adopted this technology, they tend to stick to this design for the reason that conversion to a new design is costly. Arthur (1990) has called this phenomenon lock-in effect.
Network externalities, network effects and bandwagon effects
Network externalities apply to cases when the benefits from using a technology or product increase with the number of other users making use of the same technology or product (Katz & Shapiro, 1986) . Network externalities are also referred to as network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1994; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994) or positive external consumption benefits (Katz & Shapiro, 1986) . Various authors (e.g. Katz & Shapiro, 1985 , 1986 Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994 ) draw a distinction between direct and indirect network externalities. Direct network externalities are generated 'through a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on the quality of the product'; the benefit to the user is directly related to the total number of users. Indirect network externalities involve examples that lack a direct physical effect. In this case, the relation between consumer value and the number of users in the network takes place through the increased availability of complementary products.
Value nets or technological communities.
In order for a company to increase its chance of obtaining dominance for its design, it should rapidly deploy its technology or product and should encourage the production of complementary goods. This can be achieved through inter-organizational linkages such as exclusive contracts, alliances, joint ventures, and bundling arrangements (Schilling, 1999) . The term value net is sometimes used to describe such networks. The value net of a product or technology is a network which not only consists of suppliers and producers of complementary goods, but also incorporates all the shareholders of the product or technology. A firm's linkage with this "net" delivers utility, directly as well as indirectly, to the customer and to the firm. These networks include a wide range of activities, such as sharing production facilities, collaboration in standards-setting or creating barriers to entry. Some authors (e.g. Kash & Rycroft, 2000) speak about a technological community which they define as 'individuals, groups, and organizations that share a particular model of problem-solving for a specific technology trajectory'. Srinivasan et al. (2006) found a relation between the emergence of a dominant design and the product's value net: the more firms in the value net, the greater the incentive for a firm to support the dominant design because of higher resultant revenues. Although not directly linked to the emergence of a dominant design, Dyer and Singh (1998) describe a similar phenomenon. According to them, a pair or a network of firms can develop relationships that result in sustained competitive advantage, but an increase in the number of firms in the value net will also result in higher transaction and coordination costs; a phenomenon that could similarly hinder the emergence of the dominant design.
Appropriability regime
Appropriability regime refers to 'environmental factors that govern an innovator's ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation' (Teece, 1986, p287) . It is the ability of a firm to protect an innovation from imitation by competitors (Lee et al., 1995) . According to Levin et al (1987) , the regime of appropriability can consist of six aspects: patents, secrecy, lead time, learning curve, efficiency sales and service effort. Teece (1986) identifies three legal instruments: patents, copyrights and trade secrets. The appropriability regime of a company can have a positive as well as a negative effect on the rise of a dominant design. When a firm has a superior technology, Suárez (2004) identifies a positive effect of a tight appropriability regime in order to prevent or limit the effectiveness of a competitor's efforts to attract customers to their technology. This will cause an increase in popularity for the design, which increases the chances of a dominant design to emerge. In case the support of other manufacturers is needed to achieve dominance, the company may license to other manufacturers on terms attractive to these companies (Bekkers et al., 2002) .
However, a strong appropriability regime can also have a negative influence on the emergence of a dominant design. Srinivasan et al (2006) concluded that a dominant design is more likely to emerge with weak appropriability. Protecting a technology can dramatically decrease the likelihood of that technology being chosen as the dominant design. Tight appropriability can lead to localized monopolies with several independent market niches. This phenomenon reduces selection pressures crucial for the emergence of a dominant design (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) . Furthermore, the probability of dominant design emergence can be lower due to of higher product prices which are a consequence of tight appropriability. Specifically, tight appropriability tends to limit industrywide learning effects, and thus results in higher R&D expenses (Levin et al., 1987) . Moreover, proprietary systems cause higher cost and poorer availability of complementary goods, resulting in a high risk of rejection.
Entry timing
Appropiability regime can be seen as a strategic factor in the sense that the firm can influence or control this factor. This applies to entry timing as well. Early market entry can provide the firm with a significant installed base and it creates reputation effects (Suárez, 2004) . Entering the market before a dominant design has emerged enhances the chance of survival (Suárez & Utterback, 1995) .
However, the case of the disk drive industry shows that early market entry does not guarantee the emergence of the dominant design (Cristensen, 1999; Cristensen, Suárez & Utterback, 1998) . Early entry can even lock firms into particular technological trajectories that are not consistent with the final dominant design. According to Schilling (2002) , timing of entry should depend on the evolution of complementary technologies and customer requirements: Being too early can lower a technology's likelihood of success when a firm is in an emerging market. On the other hand, in established markets, a late technology may be confronted with a technology that has already captured an extensive installed base and advantages in learning curve effects. As a result of this, Schilling (2002) found a U-shaped relationship between timing of entry and the likelihood of technological lockout; being too early or too late will lead to a technological lockout.
Pricing
A third strategic factor is pricing. Penetration pricing (low prices relative to the product's value and to the prices of similar competitors (Holden and Nagle, 1998, p7) ) can have a positive effect on the installed base, which in turn enhances the chances for a dominant design to emerge (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Clements, 2004) . Although the company may lose money in establishing their installed base, chances are that they will rise to gain the standard and finally obtain profits through future price increases, or through the sale of complementary products (Schilling, 1999) .
Reputation
The way a firm uses its marketing and public relations resources can also affect the outcome of a dominance battle. Theoretical models have long placed emphasis on the role of customers' expectations in the final outcome of a dominance battle (Katz & Shapiro, 1985) . Advertising is a powerful signaling device that may help a firm build both its actual and perceived installed base (Schilling, 1999) . The size of the installed base may serve as a signal to consumers about the quality or value of a product, especially when it is difficult for the consumer to measure those attributes. A firm's marketing and public relations efforts influence customers' expectations (Suárez, 2004) . For example, pre-announcements may create positive expectations about an upcoming product or technology. At the same time, it causes customers to postpone purchases with respect to competitors' products in the market (Farrell & Saloner, 1986) . In this way, a firm can successfully fight the increase of the competitors' installed base.
Government regulation
Sometimes, a government decides to intervene in a battle for dominance, for reasons of social responsibility towards its citizens or specific consumer welfare benefits affiliated with a single dominant design. Government regulation has the power to enforce a standard, and thus define a dominant design Suárez and Utterback, 1995 ). An example is the case of television standards (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Pelkmans & Beuter, 1987) .
Technological superiority
Last but not least, a technological superior product or technology will have a higher likelihood of achieving dominance in the market compared to competing alternatives (Suárez, 2004) . However, technological superiority need not be decisive for obtaining dominance: Although VHS was an inferior system compared to the rival system Betamax, it became the dominant design in the VCR industry.
Factors in favor of multiple designs
Introduction It may take several years before a design becomes the dominant one, but sometimes a dominant design may never emerge at all and two or more standards will exist concurrently. In that case 'several competing technologies become established and continue to co-exists and be gradually enhanced within their individual evolution paths' (Paila, 2005, p2) . Although the majority of the researchers assume that a dominant design will always emerge, some authors incorporate the possibility that a dominant design may never emerge (e.g. Srinivasan et al., 2006; Frenken et al., 1999) . Schilling takes the possibility into account that several designs can co-exist: 'In many industries, several standards may compete for years, even decades, without one technology being locked in as a dominant design' (Schilling, 2002, p388) . How can the co-existence of multiple designs be explained? The following factors can be found in literature.
Distinct features resulting in product niches and consumer communities
When rival technologies have distinct features, they may be able to survive side by side because consumers might care more about certain product attributes than network size. This can result in consumer communities, each having a preference for a specific attribute or feature. Hence, dominant designs can appear in product categories, while the overall technology does not have a single dominant design. In the printer market such an example can be identified: the current dominant design for home printers is the inkjet technology, while professional usage in firms favors laser printer technology as the dominant design. When competing standards vary in the advantages they generate for different categories of users, each of them may develop its own installed base with enough critical mass, and the subsequent lock-in effect prevents one of them from winning (Arthur, 1990) . Also Windrum and Birchenhall (1998) observed industries which differentiated into various market niches; within these niches, various alternative designs may compete or they can converge to a single design per niche.
Gateway technologies
As noted above, when competing designs each have their own unique advantages for different categories of users or in specific product categories, the designs may develop their own installed bases, and consequently can coexist in the market simultaneously. In these situations, gateway technologies can provide solutions for compatibility problems. A gateway technology establishes (ex post) compatibility between non-compatible systems. This can for example be achieved by adapters that enable conversion from the implementation of one standard to that of another standard (Baake & Boom, 1997) . Gateway technologies are typically functional in situations where several technologies survive and users desire some form of communication or connection among them. In such a situation, the costs for realizing compatibility should be lower than the cost for conversion to a new standard, the switching costs. Switching costs include the cost of acquiring new physical and human capital as well as the loss of any function that was unique to the abandoned technology (Cowan, 1991) . When the switching costs are too high, the earlier mentioned lock-in effect will arise. In brief we can assume that when a cheap and easy to realize technology is available which is able to bridge two or more incompatible products or technologies, this will work in favor of the coexistence of multiple designs.
Arrogance
Some firms (especially multinationals) can develop some degree of arrogance towards the rest of the market. This might result in an attitude of superiority and can encourage the development of a competing technology to fight the opponent technology or to continue the battle though it has become clear that the competitor will be the winner. De Vries (2001) provides a case about the latter: in a battle for dominance between two competing e-purse standards, one bank continued investments in its system after the design of the other banks had proven to be more successful, resulting in unnecessary expenditures of more than $ 1,000,000,000.
Interrelations between factors
Whether or not a dominant design emerges depends on a set of interrelated factors. Lee at al. (1995) , Schilling (1998) and Suárez (2004) have grouped such factors in a framework. The relative importance of the different factors may differ per case. In many cases, for example, regulations by governments will not apply but in instances in which a government prescribes a certain design, this factor bears the most importance. More generally: battles for dominance differ (Shapiro & Varian, 1999a) . Therefore, just 'counting' numbers of factors for single or multiple designs or weighing the factors is not necessarily meaningful. Nevertheless, Shapiro and Varian (1999b, p. 9) suggest that every battle for dominance (or standards war as they call it) is the same: 'companies heading off to fight a standards war do not have to reinvent the wheel', and 'the economics underlying such battles change little, if at all, over time'.
Case Study: Flash Memory Cards

Research approach
The factors distilled from the literature review are applied to the case of flash memory cards. First, desk research provided data necessary to deliver an overview of the different types of memory cards, their history, and any possible industry strategies undertaken to obtain dominance in the market. Next, the applicability of the different factors for standard dominance were determined for this case. This was done by turning the factors into questions (e.g., related to the factor 'Distinct features': 'Does the memory card incorporate distinct features which might address a specific group of users, or in which a niche can be formed?'). In order to get answers to these questions for each of the competing cards, face-to-face interviews were held with three industry representatives: marketing managers from Sony, Sandisk and Olympus. In order to add the user perspective concerning these factors, a sales representative of MediaMarkt, the largest consumer electronics retailer in Europe, was also interviewed. The respondents were also asked to add other factors relevant for the flash memory card case, if any. Finally, the researchers analyzed and interpreted the findings and drew conclusions.
Available flash memory cards
The most common data storage technology is the magnetic-disk or hard disk. Beyond these systems, optical systems are recognized as dominant in archival digital data storage. Despite their numerous virtues, these systems also come with several disadvantages. For example, the magnetic and optical data storage systems are not always perfect, especially in small devices with limited power supply. To avoid these disadvantages, flash memory is a good alternative. A flash memory card differs from existing memory storage in that it needs no power supply (non volatile) and can be found in a wide range of portable electronic devices. There are a number of industrial standards for memory cards. Different companies produce different types of memory cards all with different dimensions. In general, these different types are not interchangeable. Currently 2 , roughly six types of flash memory cards exist. Table 1 provides an overview of the available cards. Then, background information and competitive advantages for these diverse memory cards are briefly described. Additional information can be found in the footnotes. It was one of the smallest and the thinnest of the early memory cards, and managed to maintain a favorable cost ratio as compared to the others. It lacks a built-in controller, which kept the cost down. This feature later caused problems, since some older devices would require firmware updates to handle larger capacity cards. 5 The MultiMediaCard is based on Toshiba's NAND-based flash memory, and is therefore much smaller than earlier systems based on Intel NOR-based memory such as CompactFlash. MMC originally used a 1-bit serial interface, but newer versions of the specification allow transfers of 4 or sometimes even 8 bits at a time. They have been more or less superseded by Secure Digital cards (SD card), but still see significant use because MMC cards can be used in most devices which support SD cards and they are cheaper than SD cards. RS-MMC cards (Reduced-Size MultiMediaCards) are smaller MMC cards; by using a simple mechanical adapter to elongate the card, an RS-MMC card can be used in any MMC slot. The only significant hardware licensors of RS-MMC cards were Nokia and Siemens. 6 Sometimes a memory USB-stick is called memory stick, but in this study it is referred to the brand name of Sony's flash memory card Memory Stick™. Memory Stick is a removable flash memory card format. The Memory Stick family includes the Memory Stick PRO, a revision that allows greater maximum storage capacity and faster file transfer speeds; Memory Stick Duo, a small-form-factor version of the Memory Stick (including the PRO Duo); and the even smaller Memory Stick Micro (M2). 7 Matsushita (best known by its Panasonic brand name), Sandisk, and Toshiba first announced an agreement on a comprehensive collaboration to jointly develop, specify and widely promote a next generation secure memory card called the SD Memory Card. To create the SD card, Toshiba added encryption hardware to the already-existent MMC card, to calm music industry concerns that MMC cards would allow for easy piracy of music. 8 The xD-Picture Card is used mainly in digital cameras. Toshiba Corporation and Samsung Electronics manufacture the cards for Olympus and Fujifilm. Other brands, including Kodak, Sandisk, and Lexar, now sell xD cards as well. A couple of factors favor a single design. The use of flash memory cards is not limited to application in one product, such as a mobile phone, a copy machine or a camera. Typically, the same card is used in several products, for instance for storing data in a camera and, subsequently, for presenting the pictures somewhere else. Thus, network externalities apply. Increasingly, cards with pre-recorded media are available, for instance, music on the Gruvi card and route navigation software on SD and CompactFlash cards. These data files can be seen as complementary goods providing another factor in favor of the emergence of one dominant design. Value nets apply as well: the stronger the net, the more chance for dominance of that particular design. In this case, big firms, each with a good reputation, support the different card formats but in that sense each alliance is strong. However, such a balance between giants is instable and the natural tendency would be in the direction of one to win. Other factors which point in the direction of one design are installed base and bandwagon effects.
Card
Case Analysis and Results
The protection possibilities incorporated within a card format can be regarded as a distinct feature. This feature alone will not have any significance without government regulations. For example, in the case of DVD, consumers have to pay a copyright compensation fee in addition to the normal price of a disc. This fee is intended to compensate the copyright owner for loss in sales due to home copies. However, the fee for DVD-r/rw differs from the fee for DVD+r/rw which has influenced the war between these two in favor of DVD+r/rw. Until now, such regulation does not apply for flash memory cards but this might change. Flash memory cards differ in application area (in case of use for recording music, fees might be introduced whereas use for pictures might be without any charge) and level of protection, so government regulation concerning protection possibilities might have a major influence on the popularity of certain card formats.
The factor appropriability regime may promote the emergence of either one dominant design or multiple designs. The technology of the different memory cards is in most cases owned by its manufacturer. This manufacturer may extract license and royalty fees from other companies that implement their technology. Unwillingness to pay royalty fees may stimulate such firms to seek other solutions. The success of the MultiMediaCard can, in part, be explained by the fact that this format is royalty free. However, other card suppliers have acknowledged the disadvantages of different formats for the customers. As a consequence more cooperation and liberated use of card specific slots is at hand. In contrast to factors supporting a dominant card, the appropriability regime is the first factor pointing in the direction of multiple cards.
Distinct features of card formats can be a result of differences in fitness for use in different market segments. The xD, for instance, was primarily developed for the photography market whereas the SD was designed for music.
The speed in technological development is another factor: competition is in fact between families of cards and within each family different cards are introduced at different moments. The speed of technological change might be a reason that before a battle between cards is settled, new cards already emerge which influences the battle but does not yield any clear winner.
According to our interviewees, arrogance was at stake as well. An arrogant attitude may encourage the development of competing technologies. "Loss of face" arguments can further lengthen the duration of multiple standards but we found no evidence for this.
These supplier side factors for multiple cards do not seem to outweigh the factors pointing in the direction of one card. Especially the argument of network externalities seems to be strong. These factors concern the consumer rather than the supplier side. However, on the consumer side another factor should be mentioned. Flash memory cards can be regarded as complementary goods for host devices. The consumers' choice of the host device hardly depends on the specifications of the flash memory cards already in use as long this consumer is able to solve the problem of compatibility by means of a gateway technology. Such technologies are available. Various cheap and easy available adapters, converters, card readers etc. provide a high degree of interoperability across different (incompatible) platforms. Incentives for one standard therefore largely disappear. Digital cameras, for example, store the images on a (removable) flash memory card and it is not very difficult to make the cameras compatible with more than one type of card. It requires some minor software adaptations and a memory card slot in which multiple cards may fit. Most equipment, including digital cameras, can handle more than one type of memory card, and with multiple card readers, compatibility can be achieved very easily. From a consumer perspective, the incentives to favor a single dominant design are consequently low, the consumer will buy a camera, no matter the card specification.
In summary, there are a host of factors indicating one dominant design to emerge, in particular the network externalities characterizing the market and the need to exchange cards between different products. However, a combination of factors at both the supplier and the consumer side outweigh these factors, instead favoring multiple cards. Some factors at the supplier side make it attractive for companies to introduce or maintain their own cards, to be used in own products or for other products as well. Moreover, the speed of technological development has prompted companies to introduce new cards before a battle could turn into a victory for one of the designs. At the consumer side, a combination of two factors made it easy to live with different cards: consumers buy the host devices and take the related card format for granted rather than consciously choose a certain card format. Furthermore, gateway technologies allow them to do this: the compatibility issues can be solved in a relatively easy way resulting in the advantages related to network externalities to remain.
Conclusions and discussion
The central research question posed here is, under which conditions it is possible that two or more similar but competing designs will co-exist, instead of converge into a single dominant design. Literature cites many factors in favor of a single design but some authors also mention factors for multiple designs: distinct features per customer group, gateway technologies, arrogance of firms and, in some cases, strong appropriability regimes. Our case suggests that the statement of Shapiro and Varian (1999b) that 'the economics underlying such battles change little, if at all, over time' is wrong. First, their perception that adapters and converters are highly imperfect (Shapiro & Varian, 1999a, pp. 285-287) does not apply in our case and we expect it does not apply either in an increasing number of other cases. This is related to the gradual shift from 'mechanical' or 'analogue' towards 'digital' technologies. The fact that the content on the card is digital makes it much easier to share the information through gateway technologies. In case of analogue technologies, it was not or hardly possible to create gateway technologies, in case of digital technologies this is much easier. Secondly, an increase in the speed of technological development causes the battlefield and the forces to changes before the battle is resolved. Both developments can be seen in, for instance, the DVD case. The two different types of recordable DVDs (DVD+ and DVD-) are compatible with almost every DVD player/recorder without complex mechanical changes, so why should people make a choice? The current battle between the next-generation DVD systems (Blu-ray and HD-DVD) has already resulted in announcements by manufacturers to develop a dual-format player for both HD-DVD and Blu-ray discs. Apparently, many manufacturers decided to bear the extra cost of producing universal players that would support both formats because of the fear of a standards war that would select one standard as dominant (Schilling, 1999) . In this way, an industry remains in a situation where multiple designs continue to exist side by side. Of course, the cost of the gateway should be substantially lower than the cost of migrating from one design to another design, in the case that the first design chosen became obsolete (and, for instance, no complementary goods or services are delivered anymore). Another prerequisite for multiple designs is the rapid speed of technological advances. This is not a new but factor but some decades ago its effect was almost always outweighed by factors favoring a single design. Gradually, this is changing. Currently and increasingly, technologies are digital in a way that cheap, easy and high-quality gateway technologies are possible. This in conjunction with the faster the speed of technological developments indicates a higher chance that multiple designs remain. Still, predicting the outcome of design battles is hard and definitive proof for a specific situation cannot be derived. This applies to the flash memory case as well: during the past ten years we have seen huge fluctuations in market share of the different card families and we found no arguments why this would change in the near future. The markets for this and comparable technologies are dynamic making it difficult to predict the outcome of standards wars. Nevertheless, firms may influence the outcome of a design competition by using the factors presented in this study.
Our findings should be tested in other case studies. Both single and multiple case studies may be used (Dul & Hak, 2007) . A longitudinal multiple case study might reveal whether the number of standards battles resulting in a single standard is decreasing.
